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Abstract— Many studies have been directed to probe ring 
oscillator PUF’s feasibility in the security field, but most of them 
suffer from the lack of global approach as they analyze the 
system isolated, giving an uncompleted theory about their 
behavior.  This paper presents how adjacent hardware elements 
may affect PUF response, modifying their statistical 
characteristics and even masking the randomness of 
manufacturing process. This is a factor that should be taken into 
account when modeling the behavior of the ring oscillators in the 
PUF. Experimental results from Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGAs 
illustrate these issues. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
As a result of the big evolution in communication society, 
the use of hardware devices to carry out related-security tasks 
is growing significantly. In parallel, new attacks have been 
appearing to break the security not only of the communication 
channel but also of the devices themselves. Concerning the 
latter, active as well as passive attacks have been developed. In 
order to counteract these new attacks, a huge encourage in 
hardware protection is being needed. In this line, new 
structures have been proposed such as Physical Unclonable 
Functions (PUFs). A PUF is a physical random function that 
maps a set of challenges to a set of responses driven by 
parametric properties of physical components that are difficult 
to predict, control, or reproduce. Therefore, the mapping 
function can only be evaluated with the physical system, and it 
is unique for each physical instance. 
 In the field of hardware devices, the most interesting ones 
are silicon PUFs, which were firstly proposed in [1]. They 
exploit small variations in the hardware manufacturing process 
such as different leakage current consumption and different 
delays. Work in [2] analyzes how the peculiarities of FPGA 
routing affect the implementations of delay-based PUFs 
making arbiter and butterfly PUFs not suitable for FPGA 
implementations. PUFs without the mirror symmetry 
requirement, such as ring oscillator PUFs, present better 
qualities in this context.  
However, ring oscillator PUFs suffer from the lack of 
reliability (or reproducibility) due to their high sensibility to 
temperature, supply voltage fluctuations and influence of 
surrounding noise sources. Consequently, many studies have 
been focused on improving this feature. Basically the proposed 
approaches can be divided into those that recommend to apply 
relatively complex post-processing (such as using error-
correction codes [3]), and those that suggest to use a pre-
processing stage where only the “reliable oscillators” are 
selected  to from the PUF structure [4]-[6]. 
 Besides reliability, PUFs used for security purposes must 
show a high level of uniqueness. In this line, the idea is to 
avoid spatial gradients. A controlled placement scheme where 
adjacent oscillators are compared is proposed in [7]. A scheme 
with four oscillators combined as in the common-centroid 
layout design of analog circuits is proposed in [8]. 
 Most of these studies (focused on reliability as well as 
uniqueness) show results where the ring oscillator PUFs are the 
main circuit implemented in the die. However, the PUF finality 
is to be included into a security system. This paper presents 
that the system where the PUF is included can bias 
significantly the PUF response so that such systematic changes 
reduce the PUF uniqueness and can make inefficient some of 
the schemes proposed to improve PUF reliability. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II gives an 
overview of ring oscillator PUF characteristics and desired 
features. Section III presents a new approach to model the 
behavior of the ring oscillators in a PUF to consider the system 
where they are included. This model includes new systematic 
changes that may bias the PUF responses and can degrade PUF 
uniqueness, especially if some schemes to improve PUF 
reliability are employed. This is supported by experimental 
results obtained with the Xilinx Spartan 3 XC3S200 FPGA 
devices from Digilent Starter Boards. Section IV illustrates 
with more experimental results how these systematic changes 
can degrade PUF uniqueness, especially if some schemes to 
improve PUF reliability are employed. Finally, conclusions are 
given in Section V.  
II. BASIS OF RING OSCILLATOR PUFS 
The basic idea behind ring oscillator PUFs is that given 
equally laid and structured elements (equal number of gates 
and equal distribution), their output frequency comes defined 
by manufacturing variation. The basic structure, firstly 
proposed in [4], compares this value by counting the cycles in a 
certain time period. If the counter associated to the upper 
oscillator shows higher frequency, the corresponding output 
PUF code is ‘1’ and, otherwise, the output is ‘0’ (Fig.1). 
 However, manufacturing variations are not purely random 
[7]. Results for 90nm FPGAs shown in [9] illustrate 
graphically the frequencies of a matrix of ring oscillators with 
identical layout. The obtained surface shows a spatially 
dependent gradient (systematic dependence) together with a 
roughness all along the gradient plane (stochastic part) that is 
completely uncorrelated with position. In order to decrease the 
systematic factor, the authors in [7] proposed to place the 
oscillators as close as possible and to compare adjacent 
elements. The model they use to analyze the total delay in a 
ring oscillator is the following [7] [10]: 
dRO = dAVG + dPV + dNOISE (1) 
The delay dAVG is the nominal value of the delay based on 
architectural and technological parameters. It is the same for all 
identical oscillators. The delay dPV is due to process variation. 
It may vary from one oscillator to another and it is static, that 
is, it is assumed to be constant over time (neglecting possible 
ageing effects). The delay dNOISE represents a noisy and 
dynamic component that changes over time. This generates that 
the oscillator frequency presents a Gaussian distribution instead 
of a delta value, which could produce bit  flipping (a bit that 
changes between ‘0’ and ‘1’) because of the overlap of the 
frequency distributions. In order to filter noise, high counting 
values should be chosen. 
Taking into account the previous considerations, if the 
frequencies of two oscillators are compared, the resulting bit 
would depend on static and random process variation, and if 
several pairs are compared, the PUF response should ensure 
reliability and uniqueness: 
 
• Reliability measures how consistently a response is 
reproduced by the PUF for the same challenge over 
several read outs. It is calculated as the average intra-
class Hamming distance, HD(R, R’), over x samples, 
as follows: 
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• Uniqueness measures how distinctly the PUF can 
identify the device where it is included. It is 
calculated as the average inter-class Hamming 
distance, as follows: 
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Where m is the number of devices and n is the number of 
bits in the PUF responses (Ri). 
Uniqueness is reduced if the responses of the PUFs have 
bits with always the same value (‘0’ or ‘1’) in all the chips. 
This problem is also known as bit aliasing. 
The ideal PUF behavior should provide R of 0%, U of 50% 
and 0% of repeated bits (no bit takes the same value in all the 
devices) 
III. REDEFINING THE MODEL OF RING OSCILLATORS IN PUFS 
According to the model proposed in (1), the frequency of a 
ring oscillator can be expressed as fRO = f(dAVG , dPV , dNOISE). 
The validity of this model has been analyzed by performing 
several experiments with ring oscillator PUFs implemented in 
Spartan 3 FPGAs (with XC3S200 devices). The oscillators 
implemented have 4 inverters and 1 NAND gate meeting all 
the considerations discussed in the previous section. 
A.  Contribution of process variations and system over PUF  
 A PUF with 16 ring oscillators has been implemented in 
three different FPGAs (F1, F2, and F3). The 16 oscillators are 
constrained (manually) to form an 8x2 matrix in the centre of 
the die. The frequencies of the different oscillators are 
measured by comparing the result of their associated counters 
with the count of a reference element working at the board 
frequency of 50 MHz. 
The behavior of the PUF has been analyzed when included 
into four different and simple systems: 
• Case1: only the PUF with 16 oscillators is included in 
the FPGA. The rest of the circuitry necessary for 
processing the oscillator comparisons is placed and 
routed freely by the ISE CAD tools. 
 
• Case2: A PUF with 16+16 oscillators is implemented 
(16 oscillators, which are disabled, are added to 
Case1). 
 
•  Case3: The place occupied by the 16 added 
oscillators of Case2 is marked as “prohibit” by the 
ISE CAD tools, so that it appears empty in the final 
floorplan of the system (like Case1 but the rest of the 
circuitry is not placed freely). 
 
• Case4: A PUF with 64 (16+16+16+16) oscillators is 
implemented (48 oscillators, which are disabled, are 
added to Case1). 
 
The average frequencies of the 16 ring oscillators in the 
different devices and cases are shown in Table I. It can be seen 
that one device (F2) is always the fastest, independently of the 
case, while F1 is always the slowest. This is due to the 
contribution of process variations. However, Table I shows 
how the average frequency of the 16 oscillators changes 
depending on the system implemented. The frequency variation 
depends on the relation between the PUF and the system. If the 
system is bigger, the frequency of the oscillator appears clearly 
modified. 
 
Fig. 1.  Basic ring oscillator PUF proposed in [4]. 
 
Contribution of the system over the PUF is different to 
contribution of process variation. The changes in the oscillator 
frequencies do not correspond to a global displacement with 
random variations around but it follows a certain pattern. This 
can be appreciated in Figure 2, which illustrates how the 
influence of the system imposes a similar pattern in all the 
devices. Hence, the model shown in (1) to analyze the total 
delay in a ring oscillator should be refined to include another 
delay, dSYSTEM, so that the frequency of a ring oscillator is also 
function of the system: 
dRO = dAVG + dPV + dNOISE + dSYSTEM (4) 
 
The influence of dSYSTEM is the consequence of the special 
sensitivity that ring oscillator show to power supply variations. 
This fact makes them really sensitive to changes in its 
surroundings. Variations of ring oscillator frequencies with 
power supply fluctuation have been analyzed experimentally 
with a variation of +/-5% of nominal value. For this purpose, 
the 1.2V regulator that feeds the FPGA core has been 
disconnected and changed by an external power source. The 
result of this analysis is that for a range of 1.14V to 1.26V the 
change of the ring oscillator frequencies is 17.04MHz. 
 Concerning temperature variation, the oscillator 
frequencies decrease almost linearly when temperature 
increases, with a slope of -0.14MHz per Celsius degree. This 
means that the influence of temperature variation is very much 
smaller than the influence of power supply variation (to 
produce a similar change in oscillator frequencies, the 
temperature should change in more than 118º C). 
IV. REDUCTION OF PUF RELIABILITY AND UNIQUENESS 
 
The influence of the system on the PUF response can 
deteriorate the PUF performance in terms of reliability and 
uniqueness. Concerning reliability, the PUF response may vary 
for the same device if the system implemented in the device 
changes. Concerning uniqueness, the PUF response may not 
vary very much for different devices. 
Let us illustrate quantitatively these issues for the 
experiments commented in the previous section. The PUF 
response analyzed has 14 bits as the result of comparing 7+7 
pairs of adjacent oscillators. Reliability is measured with 
equation (2), considering that the read outs correspond to the 
PUF responses obtained from the same device with different 
implemented systems (Case1 to Case4). The results are shown 
in Table II. Uniqueness is measured with equation (3), 
considering different devices with the same system 
implemented (Case1 to Case4). Results are shown in Table III 
(uniqueness decreases as the influence of the system increases). 
The third column in Table III illustrates how the influence of 
the system may produce that the 50% of the bits in the PUF 
response are equal in all the devices.  
Comparing Table II and Table III, it can be observed that in 
the extreme case (Case4) the intra-class Hamming distance 
calculated (22.62%) is close to the inter-class Hamming 
distance (32.14%). This means that given an obtained PUF 
response, it is almost not possible to distinguish if it comes 
from the same FPGA with a different implemented system or 
from the same system implemented in a different FPGA. 
In order to validate how the influence of the system can 
reduce the PUF uniqueness, a new scheme has been tested. It 
consists in two different PUF structures merged. Each one is 
composed by 32 ring oscillators distributed into an 8x4 matrix. 
The columns of the structures are interleaved, that is, the even 
columns belong to one structure while the odd columns belong 
to the other. Only one oscillator is active during a measure 
(the rest of the oscillators are disabled to avoid any kind of 
coupling). In these circumstances, the influence of ring 
oscillators could be similar to any other disabled circuitry 
placed in that position (as happens in Case1 and Case2 of the 
previous experiments). Two cases have been studied: 
 
• CaseA: The output bits are obtained by comparing 
one oscillator in an even column with its adjacent 
oscillator. The output bit stream of the PUF has 28 
bits. The odd columns form the “surrounding 
system”.  
 
• CaseB: The 28 output bits are obtained as 
previously but evaluating the oscillators in the odd 
columns. The even columns form the “surrounding 
system”. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the frequencies of the 8x4 
oscillators. A similar pattern can be observed for all devices in 
both cases. As a consequence, 13 out of the 28 bits are the 
same in the 9 devices analyzed, which conforms a 46.43% of 
the bitstream and presents a bad figure for authentication or 
identification purposes. Uniqueness results (measured using 
(3)) are 24.40% for CaseA and 21.63% for CaseB, which are 
far from the ideal 50%. This can be seen in Tables IV and V, 
which show the Hamming distance matrixes of both cases. 
Several approaches reported in literature to increase the 
PUF reliability such as those of [4] [5] suggest to compare the 
fastest and the slowest oscillator in a matrix. If any of those 
proposals are used in these situations, the same output would 
be obtained in all the devices. 
TABLE I 
AVERAGE FREQUENCY (MHZ) OF THE 16 OSCILLATORS 
 Case1 Case2 Case3 Case4 
F1 181.51 181.52 181.18 178.35 
F2 194.91 194.65 194.13 191.86 
F3 188.35 188.44 188.11 185.93 
 
 
  (a) (b) 
Fig. 2.  Frequencies of 16 oscillators in 3 FPGAs: (a) Case1. (b) Case4. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
After the study of different ring oscillator PUF structures 
on Spartan 3 FPGAs, it can be concluded that the whole system 
where the PUF is included determines in clear way the 
behavior and so statistical security features of the PUF. The 
cause is the power supply variations that are induced on the 
die. Since this influence can mask the manufacturing 
variability, the uniqueness property of the PUF is deteriorated. 
In addition, the strategies to increase the PUF reliability could 
even further reduce the PUF uniqueness. Hence, when a ring 
oscillator PUF structure is designed, the global system where it 
is included must be taken into account. The system should be 
the same during the enrollment process (when the bitstream of 
the PUF response is registered to create an ID or a key) and the 
authentication process (when the same PUF response is wanted 
to be reproduced).  
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TABLE II 
RELIABILITY (INTRA-CLASS HAMMING DISTANCE) FOR 3 FPGAS 
 F1 F2 F3 
Case1 and Case2 21.43% 14.29 % 14.29  % 
Case1 and Case3 21.43 % 28.57 % 7.14  % 
Case1 and Case4 14.29 % 42.86 % 28.57  % 
Case2 and Case3 42.86 % 28.57 % 7.14  % 
Case2 and Case4 21.43 % 28.57 % 14.29 % 
Case3 and Case4 21.43% 28.57% 21.43% 
Total 23.81% 28.57 % 15.48% 
TABLE III 
UNIQUENESS (INTER-CLASS HAMMING DISTANCE AND BIT ALIASING) 
 Inter-Class_HD Repeated bits 
Case1 42.86% 35.71% 
Case2 47.62% 42.86% 
Case3 57.14% 14.29% 
Case4 32.14% 50.00% 
 
TABLE IV 
INTER-CLASS HAMMING DISTANCE MATRIX (IN %) FOR CASEA 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
F1 0 21.4 21.4 35.7 25.0 17.9 28.6 17.9 17.9 
F2  0 7.1 28.6 32.1 17.9 28.6 25.0 17.9 
F3   0 28.6 32.1 17.9 21.4 25.0 25.0 
F4    0 17.9 25.0 14.3 32.1 25.0 
F5     0 35.7 17.9 35.7 21.4 
F6      0 25.0 21.4 28.6 
F7       0 32.1 25.0 
F8        0 28.6 
F9         0 
 
TABLE V 
INTER-CLASS HAMMING DISTANCE MATRIX (IN %) FOR CASEB 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
F1 0 25.0 10.7 25.0 32.1 21.4 28.6 17.9 25.0 
F2  0 28.6 28.6 35.7 25.0 25.0 35.7 28.6 
F3   0 21.4 28.6 25.0 17.9 14.3 28.6 
F4    0 21.4 25.0 10.7 28.6 14.3 
F5     0 10.7 10.7 21.4 7.1 
F6      0 14.3 17.9 10.7 
F7       0 25.0 10.7 
F8        0 21.4 
F9         0 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Frequencies of the 8x4 oscillators in CaseA (each line 
corresponds to the 32 oscillators in an FPGA). 
 
Fig. 4 Frequencies of the 8x4 oscillators in CaseB (each line 
corresponds to the 32 oscillators in an FPGA). 
